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Highlights  
 
 We explore the extent to which minimum wages induce substitution away from 
workers whose jobs are more easily automated. Minimum wage increases have the 
potential to spur the automation of low-skilled jobs, via substituting technology for 
low-skilled workers. 
 Our work is timely given that many U.S. states have continued to regularly raise their 
minimum wages. 
 Our analysis draws on CPS data from 1980-2015. We find that increasing the 
minimum wage decreases significantly the share of automatable employment held by 
low-skilled workers; with the largest effects being felt in manufacturing and by older, 
females and Black workers.   
 An analysis of individual transitions from employment to nonemployment (or to 
employment in a different job) leads to similar overall conclusions. 
 We have identified workers whose vulnerability to being replaced by machines has 
been amplified by minimum wage increases. Such effects may spread to more 
workers in the future. 
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Abstract 
We study the effect of minimum wage increases on employment in automatable jobs 
– jobs in which employers may find it easier to substitute machines for people – focusing on 
low-skilled workers for whom such substitution may be spurred by minimum wage increases. 
Based on CPS data from 1980-2015, we find that increasing the minimum wage decreases 
significantly the share of automatable employment held by low-skilled workers, and 
increases the likelihood that low-skilled workers in automatable jobs become nonemployed 
or employed in worse jobs. The average effects mask significant heterogeneity by industry 
and demographic group, including substantive adverse effects for older, low-skilled workers 
in manufacturing. We also find some evidence that the same changes improve job 
opportunities for higher-skilled workers. The findings imply that groups often ignored in the 
minimum wage literature are in fact quite vulnerable to employment changes and job loss 
because of automation following a minimum wage increase.  
 
 
 
 We are grateful to John Addison and Jonathan Meer, as well as anonymous referees, for 
helpful suggestions. 
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Introduction  
For decades, economists have studied the effects of the minimum wage on employees 
in the United States. These studies have largely focused on the employment effects for low-
skilled workers – with the principal focus on teenagers. Overall, there is some controversy 
regarding whether disemployment effects exist, with some studies finding no effects,
1
 
although with more – and more diverse kinds of studies – finding evidence of disemployment 
effects.
2
  
In this study, we explore the extent to which minimum wages induce substitution 
away from workers whose jobs are more easily automated. For instance, employers may 
substitute away from labor with technological innovations – such as supermarkets 
substituting self-service checkout for cashiers, and assembly lines in manufacturing plants 
substituting robotic arms for workers. At the same time, firms may hire other workers who 
perform new tasks that are complementary with the new technology. For example, a firm 
using more robots may hire individuals to service, troubleshoot, and maintain these new 
machines. It seems reasonable to expect that the workers more likely to be replaced following 
minimum wage increases are those who are low skilled, earning wages affected by increases 
in the minimum wage, while workers who “tend” the machines are higher skilled. This 
suggests that there is a potential for labor reallocation away from jobs that are automatable 
following increases in the minimum wage, that low-skilled workers in automatable jobs are 
particularly vulnerable to minimum wage increases, and that the net disemployment effects 
                                                 
1
 See, for example, Card and Kruger (1994); Card and Kruger (2000); Dube, Lester, and Reich 
(2010); Allegretto, Dube, and Reich (2011); and Addison, Blackburn, and Cotti (2012). 
2
 See for example Neumark and Wascher (1996); Neumark (2001); Singell and Terborg (2007); 
Neumark and Wascher (2007); Thompson (2009); Sabia, Burkhauser, and Hansen (2012); Neumark, 
Salas, and Wascher (2014a, 2014b); Clemens and Wither (2016); Meer and West (2016); and Powell 
(2016). Neumark (2017) reviews the very recent literature, classifying the kinds of studies that find 
disemployment effects and the kinds that do not. 
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may be smaller than the gross effects that workers in automatable tasks experience.
3,4
  
We choose to focus on automation as it has been one of the dominant forces that has 
threatened low-skilled jobs in the United States in recent decades (Autor and Dorn, 2013; 
Autor, Dorn, and Hanson, 2015), presumably because of both technological advances and 
reductions in the cost of technology that can substitute for low-skilled labor. As emphasized 
by Autor and Dorn (2013) and Goos, Manning, and Salomons (2014), the hollowing out of 
mid-skill occupations has been a significant channel through which automation has affected 
the occupation distribution over time. However, the advancement of technology in industry 
has also touched the occupations in which low-skilled individuals work. This is illustrated in 
Figure 1, which shows a clear downward trend in the degree to which job tasks of low-skilled 
individuals are automatable, from 1980-2015.
5
 There is also evidence that this was spurred by 
computerization. Autor et al. (2003) document that computer adoption is positively correlated 
with routine task intensity. These are the tasks that are most easily automatable, and Autor et 
al. document a clear decline, since 1960, in jobs that are relatively intensive in these tasks.  
Autor and Dorn (2013) show that computerization in industry has accelerated over the last 
four decades, and this technology diffused faster into areas that have higher shares of 
automatable employment. Such evidence suggests, as we would expect, that firms choose to 
substitute technology for workers as it becomes cheaper for them to do so.  
The core idea or hypothesis underlying our analysis is that minimum wage increases 
                                                 
3
 Of course, employers can respond to an increase in the minimum wage in a number of ways besides 
culling jobs. Other channels of adjustment that have been explored in the minimum wage literature 
include changes in hours – where the empirical evidence is mixed (see Neumark and Washer, 2008, p. 
78), job amenities (see Simon and Kaestner, 2004), prices (see Aaronson, 2001; Aaronson, French, 
and MacDonald, 2008; Lemos, 2008; and MaCurdy, 2015), and compression of wage differentials 
(see DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux, 1996; and Autor, Manning, and Smith, 2016).  
4
 In a recent paper, Basker et al. (2017) explore a different kind of substitution of technology for labor 
(at least, the firm‟s labor) that can occur in response to a higher minimum wage – namely, substitution 
of a customer‟s labor for a worker‟s labor (in, e.g., a self-service gas station, or using a bank ATM). 
They suggest that this kind substitution may occur when low-skilled labor becomes expensive and 
technology enables labor replacement in tasks that are not easy to automate.  
5
 Figure 1 is based on a measure of “routine task intensity” (RTI) discussed below (see equation (1)).  
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have the potential to spur the automation of low-skilled jobs, via substituting technology for 
low-skilled workers. These minimum wages increases raise the price of low-skilled labor, 
increasing the cost savings from this substitution. The main aim of our paper is to explore this 
hypothesis, and in so doing to provide a richer understanding of how minimum wage policies 
have been shaping the type of employment held in the United States, within industries, and 
for particular demographic and skill groups.  
Specifically, we first assess whether the share of employment that is automatable 
declines in response to minimum wage increases. We focus on jobs that tend to be held by 
low-skilled workers, given that these are the jobs for which labor costs increase the most in 
relative terms following a minimum wage increase, which can prompt firms to substitute 
from people (low-skilled ones, in particular) towards machines. We complement our analyses 
of how the share of employment in automatable jobs responds to minimum wage increases 
with analyses of employment impacts for individual workers, estimating whether the 
probability that a low-skilled individual working in an automatable loses their job is larger 
following a minimum wage increase. We also explore other impacts on low-skilled workers, 
as well as whether job opportunities improve for higher-skilled workers in the industries 
where a high share of low-skilled employed was in automatable jobs.  
Our analysis is related to concurrent research by Aaronson and Phelan (forthcoming), 
who, for the period 1999-2009, analyze the susceptibility of low-wage employment to 
technological substitution in the short run. Specifically, they focus on regressions that model 
the probability of being employed within the next two years against measures of the task 
content in an individual‟s current job. They find that minimum wage increases lead to job 
losses for cognitively-routine jobs, but not manually-routine or non-routine jobs. Their study 
provides some evidence that firms may automate routine jobs in response to a minimum 
wage increase, reducing employment opportunities for workers in routine jobs.  
Our study contributes beyond this analysis in a number of ways. First, while 
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Aaronson and Phelan (2017) are concerned with an average individual‟s job loss, we focus on 
quantifying how shares in the employment of automatable tasks change following a 
minimum wage change, to provide more evidence on how the task composition of the 
workforce is affected. Second, we expect that automation is a viable and likely substitute for 
certain types of low-skilled jobs, and therefore also certain types of low-skilled labor, 
implying that average effects may mask significant heterogeneity. We therefore attempt to 
provide a fuller picture of labor market adjustments across industries and a variety of 
demographic groups, which can uncover these important differential responses. As discussed 
below, this if of particular interest with respect to the broader minimum wage literature.  
Third, for those who lose their jobs to automation following a minimum wage 
increase, we expect that the risk of not being able to find a similar job is greater for some 
groups as compared to others, and that an inability to do so has longer-term adverse 
consequences for earnings (and re-employment). Hence, we also analyze the effects of 
minimum wage increases on whether particular types of low-skilled individuals working in 
automatable jobs are more or less likely to stay in the same “job” (narrow occupation and 
broad industry) following a minimum wage increase. Finally, we extend the analysis to cover 
more outcomes for low-skilled workers, and to assess effects on higher-skilled workers.   
Together, our analyses provide the first evidence on how the shares of automatable 
jobs change following a minimum wage increase, and on the effects of minimum wages on 
groups that are very often ignored in the minimum wage literature, such as effects on older 
less-skilled workers who are in jobs where it is easier to replace people with machines.  
Our work is timely given that many U.S. states have continued to regularly raise their 
minimum wages, and a large number of additional states have newly implemented minimum 
wage laws (all higher than the federal minimum wage), with a number of states now indexing 
their minimum wages. As of January 7, 2017, 30 states (including the District of Columbia) 
had a minimum wage higher than the federal minimum wage of $7.25, ranging as high as $11 
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in Washington State, and $11.50 in the District of Columbia.
6
 Moreover, many U.S. cities 
have implemented minimum wages, with the minimum wage in Seattle (and nearby Sea-Tac) 
already reaching $15. Policy debate regarding these increases frequently references the 
literature on disemployment effects discussed above (a literature from which advocates on 
either side can pick evidence to support their view). But this literature largely focuses on 
teenagers, for whom employment effects are either irrelevant, or at best very tangentially 
related, to the more important policy question of whether higher minimum wages help low-
income families. If employment changes in response to higher minimum wages mask larger 
gross effects for subgroups of low-skilled workers in automatable tasks – and in particular 
subgroups ignored in the existing minimum wage literature – then the reliance of 
policymakers on evidence for teenagers may be ignoring potentially adverse effects for older 
workers more likely to be major contributors to their families‟ incomes.  
Our empirical analysis draws on CPS data from 1980-2015. We distinguish between 
occupations that are intensive in automatable tasks by drawing on definitions provided in 
Autor and Dorn (2013) and Autor et al. (2015). We calculate for each industry within each 
state-year cell an automatable employment share.
7
 The core of our analysis links these 
measures to changes in the relevant minimum wage.  
Overall, we find that increasing the minimum wage decreases significantly the share 
of automatable employment held by low-skilled workers. Our estimates suggest that the 
elasticity of this share with respect to the minimum wage is −0.10. However, these average 
effects mask significant heterogeneity by industry and by demographic group. In particular, 
there are large effects on the shares of automatable employment in manufacturing, where we 
estimate an elasticity of −0.18). Within manufacturing, the share of older workers in 
automatable employment declines most sharply, and the share of workers in automatable 
                                                 
6
 See https://www.dol.gov/whd/minwage/america.htm (viewed February 1, 2017).  
7
 We actually distinguish between urban and non-urban areas within each state.   
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employment also declines sharply for women and blacks.  
Our analysis at the individual level draws many similar conclusions. We find that a 
significant number of individuals who were previously in automatable employment are 
nonemployed in the period following a minimum wage increase. These effects are relatively 
larger for individuals employed in manufacturing, and are larger for the oldest and youngest 
workers, for females and for blacks. Overall, this analysis points to important heterogeneity 
in the employment effects of minimum wages – including some potentially positive effects 
for higher-skilled workers in jobs where the minimum wage spurs substitution away from 
low-skilled workers in automatable jobs. Moreover, our evidence highlights potentially 
adverse consequences of higher minimum wages for groups of workers that have not 
typically been considered in the extensive research literature on the employment effects of 
minimum wages. Thus, a main message from our work is that groups often ignored in the 
minimum wage literature are in fact quite vulnerable to employment changes and job loss 
because of automation following a minimum wage increase.  
Analysis of Shares of Employment in Automatable Jobs  
Methods 
Most of our analysis focuses on low-skilled individuals, who we define as having a 
high school diploma equivalent or less. We use data from Autor and Dorn (2013) and Autor 
et al. (2015) to measure routine task intensity (RTI) in jobs held by low-skilled workers. 
These authors use RTI as a proxy for determining the degree to which the tasks within an 
occupation are automatable. The use of measures of routine tasks from the Dictionary of 
Occupation Titles, to construct this kind of proxy for automatable employment, was first 
introduced by Autor et al. (2003). In particular, routine task intensity in each three-digit 
occupation is defined as follows:  
RTIk = ln(Tk
R) − ln(Tk
M) − ln(Tk
A
)       (1)  
where Tk
R
, Tk
M
, and Tk
A
 are the levels of routine, manual, and abstract task inputs for 
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occupation k.
8
 Routine tasks involve a repeated sequence of actions, are easily codifiable, and 
are therefore substitutable with technology. In contrast, manual tasks require actions that are 
not generally predictable in sequence, so substitution with technology is limited.  
To provide some examples, blue-collar jobs that are highly routine include machinists 
and typesetters.  Jobs with low routine task intensity include bus driving and service station 
occupations. Blue-collar jobs that are classified as high on manual task intensity include taxi 
drivers, operating agents of construction equipment, and drivers of heavy vehicles, while 
meat cutters and upholsterers are low on this domain. Abstract tasks require high-level 
thinking that is more complementary with technology (Autor, 2013). Examples of low-skilled 
jobs that are high on abstract task intensity include supervisors of motor vehicle 
transportation, railroad conductors, and production foremen. Jobs that are low on abstract 
task intensity are garbage collectors, parking lot attendants, and packers. Thus, equation (1) is 
increasing in the absolute and relative quantity of tasks that are automatable within 
occupation k.  
We further calculate for each industry i, within each area a (defined as states divided 
into urban and nonurban areas), in year t, a routine employment share, as follows:  
 66 1
1 1
( ( ) 1[ ])( ( ))
K K
P
iat iat k iat
k k
RSH L RTI RTI L 
 
     .     (2)  
In equation (2), Liat is equal to total employment in industry i in area a at time t. 1[.] is 
an indicator function equal to one if an occupation is in the top third of the employment-
weighted distribution of RTI across occupations (RTI
P66
 denotes the 66
th
 percentile), using 
only low-skilled workers.  The numerator is then the share of automatable low-skill 
employment in a particular industry, area, and year, and the denominator is total low-skilled 
employment in that industry, area, and year.  
                                                 
8
 These levels are defined using variables from versions of the Dictionary of Occupation Titles, where 
incumbents are asked to grade the level of their occupation with respect to particular attributes.   
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Our analysis initially focuses on the following specification: 
 
RSHiat= b1Log(MWst
 )+ Aa  + Tt + iat   ,        (3)  
where MWst denotes the minimum wage in state s at time t. We use the log of minimum 
wages following the literature on minimum wages in the last decade or more. Equation (3) 
also includes area (Aa) and year (Tt), fixed effects. Area is defined as state-specific dummy 
variables interacted with whether the individual lives in an urban area or not. Negative and 
significant estimates of b1 would imply that the share of employment that is automatable 
declines in response to minimum wage increases.
9
  
We next turn to disaggregating these effects across industries and demographic 
groups, to see whether there are sectors or groups particularly vulnerable to automation in 
response to minimum wage increases. In other work, differential patterns of task reallocation 
have been documented across demographic groups. For example, less-educated, male, and 
young workers have been the most susceptible to reductions in employment that is intensive 
in routine tasks (Autor and Dorn, 2013; Autor and Dorn, 2009). We therefore focus on 
differences in effects by age and sex, and we also examine differences by race.
10
 Specifically, 
for race we look at whites and blacks (we do not look at other categories given small cell 
sizes), and for age we look at those aged 40 and over, those aged 25 or younger, and the 
intermediate group aged 26-39.  
To unpack the impact of minimum wage increases by age, sex, and race, we use 
measures of task intensity for each subgroup (indexed by c), as follows:  
                                                 
9
 We also augmented equation (3) adding up to three lags of the minimum wage variable. The 
inclusion of lags allows for a period of adjustment to reorganize the factors of production away from 
labor and towards capital investments in technology (and perhaps other complementary labor). In all 
models, the lags were not significant, suggesting that investment in technology is relatively fast. As 
we discuss later, however, the minimum wage is defined based on the average minimum wage in the 
current and past 11 months, itself averaged over the year, so that the absence of lagged effects still 
allows effects that can arise over nearly two years.    
10
 The minimum wage literature also has many of examples of papers that consider variation in 
employment effects across subgroups – for example, gender (Dube, Lester, and Reich, 2016), age 
(Giuliano, 2012), and ethnicity (Allegretto, Dube, and Reich, 2011).  
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66 1
1 1
( ( ) 1[ ])( ( ))
K K
P
ciat ciat k ciat
k k
RSH L RTI RTI L 
 
    .
11
    (4)  
In this case the numerator is the share of automatable employment held by a subgroup 
in a specific industry, area, and year, and the denominator is total employment of a subgroup 
by industry, area, and year. We estimate equation (3) for the separate subgroups, indexed by 
c, using RSH as defined in equation (4).   
There are two main sources of tasks that are routine intensive. The first are tasks 
found in blue-collar manufacturing occupations that are also capital intensive. For example, 
automobiles are most often produced using conveyor belts. Workers perform tasks within this 
assembly line, which are routine and substitutable with robotic arms. The second is codifiable 
administrative-support tasks that are typical to the inputs required in the financial services 
industries, among others (Autor and Dorn, 2013; Autor et al., 2015). The variation across 
industries in the proportion of individuals that are working in automatable employment, 
among low-skilled workers, is reported in column (1) of Table 1. Finance, retail, 
manufacturing, and public administration (“P. Adm.”) have particularly high shares of low-
skilled workers doing automatable tasks.  
We expect the minimum wage to change the share of employment in automatable 
tasks in differing degrees for particular industries. The impact directly relates to how 
dominant an automatable task type is among low-skilled in the industry in question, and the 
ease and cost of automating tasks. To uncover whether there are differential effects by 
industry we estimate equation (3) separately by one-digit industry, in the aggregate (using 
RSH as defined in equation (2)), and by demographic group (using RSH as defined in 
equation (4)).  
Data 
                                                 
11
 RTIk and RTI
P66
 are computed, as before, for all low-skilled workers.  
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Our main data source for the analysis of employment shares is pooled monthly CPS 
samples from 1980-2015. These data are matched to monthly state-level data on the 
minimum wage.
12
 We allow for a period of adjustment by defining the minimum wage as the 
average over the current month plus the last 11 months. In addition, we do not include 
agriculture and mining in our subgroup analysis by industry, as we cannot meaningfully or 
reliably calculate RSHiat in many states or areas with a low representation of these industries. 
We then create our share of employment variable on a yearly basis.
13
  
 We rely on crosswalks provided by Autor and Dorn (2013) and Dorn (2009) to 
convert occupation codes in the CPS to a consistent coding system across years.
14
 RTI, 
described in equation (1), is provided by Autor and Dorn (2013) and is matched to the CPS 
data using this coding system. As noted earlier, we use data on low-skilled individuals with a 
high school diploma equivalent or less.  
Individual-Level Analysis 
Methods 
Even if the share of automatable jobs declines for low-skilled workers (per the prior 
analysis), employment opportunities need not decline if these workers are reallocated to non-
automatable jobs. We therefore also estimate regressions using individual-level data on low-
skilled individuals to explore whether job prospects worsen for those low-skilled workers 
who were in routine jobs when the minimum wage increases. Specifically, we estimate the 
model:
     
 
 Empjiai+1=b1∙RSHjiat∙Log(MWat)+ b2RSHjiat +Tt∙As +  jiat    ,        (5)  
                                                 
12
 These minimum wage data are available at https://www.socsci.uci.edu/~dneumark/datasets.html. 
13
 This choice is made for statistical reasons given that cell sizes are too small for accurate calculation 
of RSHiat on a monthly basis, especially for some industries and demographic groups. This level of 
analysis is also more intuitive given that automation requires some period of adjustment.  
14
 Specifically, we follow Lordan and Pischke (2016) and match the currently relevant Census 
occupation code system (1980, 1990, 2000 or 2010) to the relevant Autor and Dorn crosswalk. This 
gives us a consistent coding system that can be matched directly to our measure of automatable tasks.  
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where Emp is the probability that the
 
j
th
 person is employed in industry i, area a, at time t+1. 
It is assigned zero if a person was nonemployed in t+1. The sample consists of those 
employed in period t, and either employed or nonemployed (i.e., unemployed or not in the 
labor force) in period t+1.  
Equation (5) relates this job loss to workers having held a routine job in period t, and 
faced a minimum wage increase, with the coefficient b1 on the interaction RSHjiat∙Log(MWat ) 
capturing whether a person in automatable work is more vulnerable to job loss following a 
minimum wage increase, compared to those not in automatable work. Note that the minimum 
wage and the routine share (RSH) are measured in period t, and the employment transition is 
measured from period t to period t+1.
15
 All control variables are also measured at time t. We 
can only look at those initially employed because we need to classify jobs by RTI; hence, we 
capture only flows out of employment.
16
  
Equation (5) also includes a full set of area-by-year interactions (where area is defined 
by state and urban or nonurban areas within states), to allow flexibly for differential yearly 
shocks to states and subareas of states.
17
 Given the inclusion of the area-by-year interactions, 
the main effect Log(MWst) drops out of the equation, and identification of the coefficient on 
the interaction comes from variation in the availability of automatable jobs within areas 
across time.
18
  
                                                 
15
 One might want to measure RSH prior to when the minimum wage is measured, to avoid 
contemporaneous changes associated with the minimum wage. But we do not have longer lagged 
information on employment with which to lag the measurement of RSH.  
16
 We cannot investigate models with lags or additional leads as we do not know where the individual 
was working beyond two periods.  
17
 We cannot allow this much flexibility in the share analysis because this is the level at which the 
minimum wage variation arises in that analysis. In contrast, here we can because we are interested in 
the effect of the interaction between RSH and the minimum wage.  
18
 We cannot meaningfully document the overall effect of minimum wages on wages of those in 
automatable work, since this would restrict us only to those who are employed in both periods, and 
because the main effect of the minimum wage is subsumed in the fixed effects. Moreover, we do not 
necessarily expect a larger wage effect for those in automatable work; the substitution response may 
simply be larger. We did verify that in models for wages, the estimate of b1 is negative and significant. 
Assuming (as in past work) that minimum wages on average raise wages of low-skill workers, this 
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All other definitions are consistent with equations (1) through (4). If individuals 
working in automatable jobs at the time of a minimum wage increase are more likely to lose 
jobs by the next period, compared to individuals affected by the same minimum wage 
increase but who are in jobs that are not automatable, we would expect the coefficient on b1 
to be negative. As in the share analysis, we explore heterogeneity in b1 by estimating 
equation (5) separately by industry and by demographic subgroup.  
We complement these regressions with analyses that consider a dependent variable 
that equals one if an individual had the same narrow occupation code (3-digit) and broad 
industry code (1-digit) in the interview year, and zero otherwise (including both the 
nonemployed and “job” switchers). In these analyses, b1 < 0 would reflect transitions to other 
employment or to nonemployment – with the former presumably reflecting, to some extent, 
movements of out of employment in automatable tasks following a minimum wage increase.  
Data  
We estimate equation (5) using data from the Annual Social and Economic 
Supplement (ASEC) of the CPS. We focus only on individuals with a high school diploma 
equivalent or less, as in our shares analysis. The ASEC files are useful for our purposes 
because they include information on the occupation and industry of the job held by 
respondents in the previous year, which is period t in the analysis described above. Thus, 
RSH is based on this occupation. Columns (2) and (3) of Table 1 report the average 
probabilities that employed, low-skilled workers in automatable jobs remain employed, or in 
the same “jobs” (for those who remain in the labor force). 
Identification 
                                                                                                                                                        
suggests that the pay increase induced by a higher minimum wage for those in automatable work is 
not as high as for those in non-automatable work, which fits the story that automation reduces demand 
for those in automatable tasks and may increase demand for workers with different (and likely higher) 
skills.   
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A potential issue in estimating the effects of minimum wages is whether minimum 
wage variation is correlated with shocks to low-skill labor markets – possibly due to 
endogenous policy – in which case we may not identify causal effects of minimum wages. 
This issue has arisen prominently in recent exchanges on the employment effects of 
minimum wages; see, most recently, Allegretto, Dube, and Reich (2017) and Neumark and 
Wascher (2017).
19
 However, we are estimating effects on a subgroup of low-skilled workers, 
and it seems less plausible that policy is chosen endogenously with respect to outcomes for 
one subgroup of low-skilled workers. Moreover, our individual-level analysis is even more 
insulated from this identification issue, because we control in an unrestricted fashion for 
yearly shocks to states, and their urban and nonurban areas separately. This approach of 
isolating the effects of minimum wages controlling for state or substate shocks has been 
advocated by Allegretto et al. (2011) and Dube et al. (2010). While this approach may raise 
other concerns (see Neumark et al., 2014a), it does have the virtue of potentially controlling 
for shocks to low-skilled labor markets that are correlated with minimum wage changes.   
Finally, evidence of leading minimum wage effects could provide evidence that 
minimum wage changes respond to expected future changes, in which case our evidence may 
not be causal. We can assess this evidence for our share analysis, which is based on a panel 
on observations on areas and industries over time. We estimated versions of equation (3) 
allowing up to three annual leading terms; these were never statistically significant, and were 
centered around zero.  
Results  
Effects on Employment Shares 
The results from our share of employment analyses (equation (3)) are reported in 
                                                 
19
 Recent work by Clemens and Wither (2015) and Baskaya and Rubinstein (2012) indicates that, if 
anything, the employment effects are more negative when accounting for correlated shocks, 
suggesting that policy variation is correlated with positive shocks. 
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Table 2. In the aggregate across all industries, as shown in column (1), we find that minimum 
wage increases cause a statistically significant reallocation of labour away from automatable 
tasks. We find that a 10 percent increase in the minimum wage leads to a 0.31 percentage 
point decrease in the share of automatable jobs done by low-skilled workers, implying an 
elasticity of −0.10.20  
When we look separately by industry, the estimated effects in construction, 
wholesale, retail, finance, and public administration are small, centered around zero, and not 
statistically significant. In contrast, the effects are larger for manufacturing, transport, and 
services, and significant at the 5- or 10-percent level for manufacturing and transport. For 
example, the estimates imply that the elasticity of the share of automatable jobs among low-
skilled workers in manufacturing with respect to the minimum wage is −0.18.  
Table 3 presents our analysis of the effects of the minimum wage on the share of 
employment in automatable jobs, broken down by demographic group and (in columns (2)-
(9) by industry. The estimates point to significant heterogeneity in these effects beyond the 
differences by industry documented in Table 2. For example, a higher minimum wage 
significantly reduces the shares of low-skilled workers in automatable jobs for all three age 
groups (only at the 10-percent level in two cases), but the magnitudes are larger for the 
youngest and oldest workers. Looking by both age and industry, for older workers (≥ 40 
years old) the negative effect mainly arises in manufacturing, retail, and public 
administration, while for younger workers (< 25 years old) the effects are large in many 
sectors, but the estimate is close to zero in manufacturing, and statistically significant only in 
services. For the middle age group (26-39) there is sizable estimated decline in 
manufacturing, but it is well under one-half the effect for older workers. Thus, older workers 
                                                 
20
 We do not include industry fixed effects in the pooled estimates, so that we can detect changes in 
the share of employment in automatable jobs arising from industry reallocation. However, the 
estimates including industry fixed effects were very similar. 
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appear more vulnerable to substitution away from automatable jobs in manufacturing when 
the minimum wage increases. Moreover, the general adverse effect of the minimum wage for 
older jobs in automatable jobs is interesting in light of the typical focus of the minimum wage 
literature – and the evidence of disemployment effects – for very young workers.  
On average, females are affected more adversely than males: in the aggregate 
estimates in column (1), the negative estimate is negative and significant only for females, 
and is ten times larger, indicating that, for females, 10 percent increase in the minimum wage 
reduces the share of automatable jobs (among the low-skilled) by 0.78 percentage point (an 
elasticity of −1.53). Across industries, these negative effects for females are concentrated in 
manufacturing, services, and public administration. For males, none of the industry-specific 
estimates are statistically significant, but the estimated effects are negative and sizable for 
manufacturing and retail.  
Table 3 also points to more adverse effects on the share in automatable employment 
for blacks than for whites, with the effect more than double for blacks.
21
 However, the effects 
are heterogeneous across industries. There are sizable adverse estimated effects for whites in 
manufacturing, transport, services, and public administration, although only the transport  
estimate is statistically significant.  For blacks, there are much larger, and statistically 
significant, decreases in automatable shares in manufacturing and transport.
22
   
                                                 
21
 The implied elasticities −0.22 and −0.10 respectively.  
22
 We have run the state-level results in Table 2 and 3 with state-specific linear trends. We should note 
that, based on other work in the minimum wage literature (e.g., Neumark and Wascher, 2017), there is 
too much emphasis placed on this kind of specification check. As Meer and West (2016) have shown, 
it can be quite tricky to define the counterfactual with linear tends. Moreover, over long sample 
periods, the linear restriction is typically unjustified, and linear trends imposed over long periods can 
lead to nonsensical results (like outcomes that must be positive becoming negative). Finally, we can 
end up substantially reducing the identifying information. As shown in the on-line appendix, when we 
add state-specific linear trends, the point estimates are generally consistent with what is reported in 
Tables 2 and 3, although the increases in standard errors tend to make the estimated effect 
insignificant (although not always). Finally, note that in the individual-level analysis we are able to 
add state-by-urban-by-year fixed effects, which completely subsume any area-specific trends (which 
are just restricted versions of arbitrary state-by-year fixed effects). This is an important advantage of 
the individual-level analysis. 
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Effects on Remaining Employed
23
 
The evidence discussed thus far indicates that higher minimum wages lead to 
substitution away from labor doing routine tasks, among low-skilled workers. However, the 
decline in the share of employment in automatable tasks may be accompanied by reallocation 
of these low-skilled workers to less routine, less automatable tasks. Still, it seems unlikely 
that job prospects would not have worsened for low-skilled workers in the aggregate, 
assuming that to some extent jobs with less routine, less automatable tasks are higher skilled.   
To study whether a higher minimum wage increases transitions to nonemployment 
among low-skilled workers who were in jobs with routine tasks, Table 4 reports estimates of 
equation (5), which models the effects of minimum wage increases on the probability a 
particular individual who holds an automatable job is still employed in the next period.  
Overall, we find evidence indicating that the negative effects on employment shares 
in automatable jobs reported in Tables 2 and 3 are associated with job loss and transitions to 
nonemployment among low-skilled workers who were initially doing automatable jobs. 
Looking across industries in the pooled estimates in column (1), we find evidence (significant 
at the 10-percent level) of a decline in the probability of remaining employed – and hence an 
increase in the probability of becoming nonemployed. The −0.001 estimate translates into a 
small elasticity of the probability of a transition to nonemployment with respect to the 
minimum wage, −0.013.24 Examining the results by industry, there is some correspondence 
between the results in Table 4 and Table 2. For example, the decline in the probability of 
remaining employed is large in manufacturing, and is sizable (and significant at the 10-
                                                 
23
 As in the employment shares analysis, we focus here on a dummy indicating whether or not a 
person is in automatable employment. We carried out similar analyses to those in this subsection, but 
using a continuous measure of RTI. The overall conclusions are generally qualitatively similar and in 
some cases stronger.  
24
 In computing these elasticities for the estimates of equation (5), note that we use the baseline 
proportion who become nonemployed (or, in Table 5, change jobs); these are one minus the types of 
mean probabilities shown in columns (2) and (3) of Table 1.   
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percent level) for services. Of course, we do not necessarily expect a tight correspondence 
between the two types of results across industries, as the possibilities for reallocation low-
skilled workers from automatable jobs may vary by industry. There appears to be a tighter 
correspondence between the results by demographic group, with the evidence in Table 4 
pointing stronger effects on job loss for younger workers and black workers.  
In Table 4, the estimates in columns (2)-(9) for the second row and below report 
results disaggregating by both industry and demographic group. One interesting results is 
that, in manufacturing, there are adverse employment effects for both the oldest and youngest 
groups of workers in automatable jobs, with implied declines in the probability of 
employment, from a 10 percent minimum wage increase, of 0.25 and 0.22 percentage point, 
respectively. The implied elasticities of the probability of becoming nonemployed are −0.28 
for older workers in manufacturing, and −0.17 for younger workers in manufacturing. Again, 
this evidence points to subsets of workers who are not typically considered in the minimum 
wage literature, yet who are vulnerable to job loss from higher minimum wages. Note, also, 
that within manufacturing, the adverse effect on employment arises for women, but not for 
men, and there is statistically significant evidence of job loss for whites, but not blacks 
(although the point estimate is larger for blacks). On the other hand, looking by industry, the 
estimates point to larger job loss effects for blacks in transport, wholesale, retail, finance, and 
services (although the estimates for the latter two industries fall well short of statistical 
significance).  
Effects on Job Switching 
Table 5 reports estimates of the same specification, but redefining the dependent 
variable to equal to one if an individual stayed in the same “job” in the subsequent period, 
and zero otherwise. A person is defined as being in the same job in t+1 if they have the same 
3-digit occupation code and 1-digit industry code.  As in Table 4, the sample is restricted to 
those employed in period t; in addition, those employed must have valid occupation codes. 
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Thus, the estimated effect of the minimum wage-routine interaction captures the change in 
job opportunities in the worker‟s initial occupation and broad industry, with a “decline” 
captured in either non-employment or a change of jobs.  
Overall, there are many additional larger, significant, and negative effects reported in 
Table 5, suggesting that higher minimum wages lead to a good deal of job switching among 
low-skilled workers in automatable jobs, in addition to transitions to nonemployment; this job 
switching is presumably another cost of higher minimum wages for these workers. In 
addition, the evidence of such effects within industries suggests there is substantial re-
allocation of labor within industries because of the minimum wage increase.  
Turning to some specific magnitudes, the overall pooled estimate of −0.0213 implies 
an elasticity, with respect to the minimum wage, of the probability of changing or losing 
one‟s job of −0.15. Across industries, the effect is negative and significant in manufacturing, 
transport, wholesale, finance, services, and public administration. The estimate is positive 
only in retail. By demographic group, the adverse effects are, as in Table 5, larger for the 
youngest and oldest workers. Interestingly, once we include job switching as well as 
transitions to nonemployment, as we do in Table 5, the evidence of adverse effects for white 
workers becomes more pronounced, and arises in every industry but retail. In contrast, when 
we looked only at transitions to nonemployment, in Table 4, the evidence of adverse effects 
for whites was much weaker. This, again, suggests that negative effects of minimum wages 
for low-skill workers in automatable jobs arise for groups that have not been the focus of 
traditional work on the employment effects of minimum wages.       
Transitions to Low-Wage Industries  
A natural follow-on question is whether individuals who are in automatable 
employment who switch jobs because of minimum wage increases are more likely to end up 
in specific industries. Autor and Dorn (2013) argue that workers displaced from automatable 
jobs tend to move to the retail and services sectors. To explore the evidence in the context of 
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minimum wage effects, we can re-estimate equation (5). We restrict the sample to those 
employed in period t, as before, but also to those employed only in industries aside from 
retail or services. We then define the dependent variable to equal one if a person moves to 
retail or services industry in t+1, and zero if they remain employed in an industry outside 
these two sectors; in the top panel, those nonemployed in period t+1 are also coded as zero. 
Thus, b1 > 0 in equation (5) (the coefficient on the interaction RSHjiat∙Log(MWat )) implies 
that a higher minimum wage pushes low-skilled workers who were in automatable jobs into 
the retail or services sectors.  The results reported in Table 6 indicate that this is the case for 
both retail and services – whether considered separately or together.    
Hours Effects  
Our analysis so far has focused on employment. However, there is also a potential for 
hours in automatable work to decrease following a minimum wage increase. We consider 
hours explicitly by re-estimating equation (3) using as the dependent variable the share of 
hours worked among low-skilled workers in automatable employment. We also re-estimate a 
version of equation (5), for the difference between an individual‟s usual hours worked in year 
t+1 and year t. In this case, we focus only on those who are employed in the two periods, 
with positive hours worked, to focus on the intensive margin response.    
The results of this analysis to some extent parallel the employment share results in 
Table 3 and the employment transition results in Table 4. The pooled estimates in the top 
panel of Table 7 imply that a minimum wage increase of $1 causes a 0.15 percentage point 
decrease in the share of hours in automatable jobs done by low-skilled workers overall (an 
elasticity of −0.05), although this estimate is not statistically significant. However, as for 
employment, there is a much larger negative effect in manufacturing. We also find larger 
hours share reductions for women and for blacks, paralleling the findings in Table 3, and 
large hours share reductions for older workers.  
The individual-level analysis is reported in the lower Panel of Table 7. The data for 
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both periods are recalled in the same interview period. The samples are smaller than in table 
4 because it only includes individuals who kept their jobs between the two periods. There is 
also loss due to non-response on the “hours worked last year” question.  The estimates 
suggest significant decreases in hours worked for those initially in automatable jobs 
following a minimum wage increase. Based on the pooled estimate, a 10 percent increase in 
the minimum wage generates a 0.16 decrease in hours worked for low-skilled individuals 
who held an automatable job in the previous period – a small but statistically significant 
effect. The estimated decline is negative, typically larger, and statistically significant in 
construction, manufacturing, transport, wholesale, finance, services, and public 
administration (in the last case only at the 10-percent level). Overall, the results indicate that 
those in automatable low-skilled work are vulnerable to hours reductions following a 
minimum wage increase. Across demographic groups, the estimated coefficients are mostly 
significant and negative. The estimated hours reductions are larger for older workers and the 
middle age group, for males versus females, and for whites versus blacks.   
Are the Effects Stronger in More Recent Data?  
It is interesting to re-estimate these models using a shorter, more recent time period, 
at the risk of losing observations, given that the move towards automation has likely 
accelerated over time, as technology has been getting cheaper, and labor more expensive. To 
this end, in Table 8 we report estimates covering 1995-2016, rather than going back to 1980. 
(We do not report estimates by industry crossed with demographic subgroups.) Comparisons 
with Tables 2-5 reveal that the overall estimates are generally stronger in the more recent 
subperiod. This suggests that the substitution response to minimum wages was higher in 
more recent years, likely because of increased ease of automation (and perhaps minimum 
wages reaching higher levels).  
Moreover, the qualitative pattern across industries and demographic groups often 
remains similar, although not always. For example, we still find large negative estimates for 
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manufacturing and transport, although the manufacturing estimate is attenuated slightly 
relative to Table 2. One difference is that in Table 8, there is a considerably larger negative 
estimated effect for public administration (marginally significant), which could be related to 
more recent diffusion of personal computers into this industry.  
Looking at demographic subgroups, one striking difference is the sharper adverse 
effect of minimum wages on remaining employed (or employed in the same job) for older 
workers. This estimated negative effect is largest for older workers in Table 8 (in both the 
middle and lower panels), but not in Tables 4 or 5. The implication is that, in more recent 
years, the adverse effect of minimum wages on employment for those in automatable jobs has 
become relatively worse for older workers, which could reflect a combination of a lower 
likelihood of retaining a job in the automatable subset of jobs, or a lower ability or 
willingness to make a transition to a non-automatable job.  
One potential concern with comparing results across sample periods is that who gets 
only a high school diploma or less is changing over time, with people achieving higher levels 
of education in more recent years. Therefore, there is a risk that negative selection into our 
definition of the low-skilled also partially explains the strengthening of the results in the most 
recent time period. However, the most important concern would be if this selection is 
associated with changes in the minimum wage; based on other research, we regard this as 
unlikely.
25
    
Probing the Effects in Manufacturing 
Returning to Tables 3-5, many of our results by industry point to declines in the share 
                                                 
25
 Some past research suggests that minimum wages may lower schooling, possibly by drawing some 
workers out of school and into full-time work, displacing from the job market high school dropouts 
who are already working (Neumark and Nizalova, 2007; Neumark and Wascher,  2003). Newer work, 
however, finds little evidence of such an effect (Neumark and Shupe, in progress). Note also that 
many of our interesting and in some ways novel results refer to workers who – unlike much past 
minimum wage research – are not teenagers or young adults, for whom any such schooling response 
is likely to be largely non-existent.      
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of automatable jobs, and increased job loss, in manufacturing. These types of findings are 
unusual in the minimum wage literature, which usually focuses on very low-skilled workers 
(hence the emphasis on teenagers, for example, and retail or restaurant workers). Then again, 
our analysis does not focus on manufacturing in the aggregate, but on low-skilled workers in 
automatable jobs. Nonetheless, if the effects we estimate in manufacturing are in fact driven 
by minimum wage increases, they should be generated from low-wage rather than high-wage 
workers.  
To that end, we estimate our key results for higher-wage and lower-wage workers in 
the manufacturing industry, based on wages in occupations within manufacturing. For each 
low-skill occupation within manufacturing,
26
 we compute average wages from the 1980-2016 
Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups of the CPS. The low-wage subsample is then defined as 
the bottom tertile of occupations in this distribution, and the high-wage subsample as the top 
tertile. These definitions are then matched to the data used for the analyses in Tables 3-5, and 
we estimate equations (3) and (5) separately for the two sub-samples. Examples of 
occupations that fall into the high-wage and low-wage categories under this definition are 
given in Table 9. Those occupations classified as low wage are typically machine operators 
of some description; in contrast, high wage earners more commonly maintain and install 
machinery. Notably, those in these low-wage occupations in the bottom tertile regularly earn 
wages at or near the minimum wage.   
The estimates in Table 10 are strongly consistent with the adverse effects of minimum 
wages on the share of employment in automatable jobs in manufacturing arising from low-
wage jobs. Specifically, the coefficient estimates for the high-wage regressions are small, 
almost never statistically significant, and centered around zero. In contrast, the coefficients in 
the models for low-wage jobs are uniformly negative, and often sizable and statistically 
                                                 
26
 We calculate the proportion of low-skilled workers in each occupation. Those with shares greater 
than 0.5 are defined as being low-skilled occupations.  
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significant. For example, the pooled estimates for low-wage occupations are negative and 
statistically significant in all three panels, as are the estimates for older workers for the share 
of employment and the probability of remaining employed (the middle panel). The only case 
where the evidence of adverse effects for low-wage workers in manufacturing is statistically 
weak is in the lower panel, for the probability that workers who are in automatable 
employment hold the same job in the next period; the estimates are always negative, but only 
the pooled estimate is statistically significant.
27
 
Effects on Higher-skilled Workers 
 We might expect that as the minimum wage reduces jobs for low-skilled workers in 
automatable jobs, it could also increase jobs for higher-skilled workers who “tend” the 
machines. For instance, going back to our manufacturing analysis, operators can be replaced 
with robotic arms, but the robotic arms need maintenance and troubleshooting.  
We explore this in Table 11. We estimate the same specification as in equation (5), 
with the only difference being that we define the dependent variable (and hence the sample) 
for higher-skilled workers). We continue to define routine work for low-skilled workers, so 
that we obtain a parallel analysis to the earlier analysis in Tables 4 and 5, but now asking 
whether the interaction of the minimum wage with a higher share of routine work for low-
skilled workers – which reduces job opportunities for them – at the same time increases job 
opportunities for higher-skilled workers. The estimates in the top panel of Table 11 are for 
the probability of remaining employed (as in Table 4), and the estimates in the bottom panel 
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 We consider an alternative definition based on industry, in which for each low-skill sub-industry (at 
the two-digit level) within manufacturing, we compute average wages from the 1980-2016 Merged 
Outgoing Rotation Groups of the CPS. The low-wage sub-sample is the bottom tertile of industries in 
this distribution, and the high-wage subsample is the top tertile. These definitions are again matched 
to the data used for the previous analyses. The results are shown in Appendix A. Compared to Table 
10, the results are quite similar. One difference is that, in this case, the is stronger statistical evidence 
of adverse effects on the probability of remaining in the same job, by demographic subgroup (e.g., for 
the oldest and youngest workers, and for women). estimates are often slightly attenuated, although the 
overall conclusions are the same.  
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are for the probability of remaining employed in the same job (as in Table 5).  
The evidence indicates that job opportunities are improved for higher-skilled workers. 
Nearly every estimated coefficient in Table 11 is positive, and the estimates are often sizable 
and in some cases statistically significant. For example, in the top panel, we find significant 
positive effects for the youngest workers and those aged 26-39, and in the bottom panel we 
find significant (or marginally significant) positive effects for women, and in transport, 
services, and public administration. Notably, we do not find evidence of a positive effect for 
older higher-skill workers in either panel, perhaps because the kinds of job opportunities 
opened up by automation require skills that these older workers are less likely to have or 
obtain.  
Conclusions  
This study empirically assesses whether there is labor reallocation away from 
automatable employment following increases in the minimum wage, and how this 
reallocation affects the type of employment held in the United States, overall, within 
industries, and for particular demographic groups. We focus specifically on jobs that tend to 
be held by low-skilled workers, for which labor costs increase the most in response to 
minimum wage increases. We estimate the impact of minimum wage increases on the share 
of low-skilled employment in automatable jobs, and on the probability that a low-skilled 
individual working in an automatable job stays employed (or stays employed in the same 
job). We explore and document considerable heterogeneity in these effects across 
demographic groups, and across industries. The analysis goes beyond the types of workers 
usually considered in the conventional, long-standing research on the employment effects of 
minimum wages, such as teenagers – studying, for example, the effects of minimum wages 
on older less-skilled workers who are in jobs where it is easier to replace people with 
machines, and on manufacturing workers in such jobs.   
Based on CPS data from 1980-2015, we find that increasing the minimum wage 
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decreases significantly the share of automatable employment held by low-skilled workers. 
The average effects mask significant heterogeneity by industry and demographic group. For 
example, one striking result is that the share in automatable employment declines rather 
sharply for older workers – and within manufacturing, most sharply for this age group. An 
analysis of individual transitions from employment to nonemployment (or to employment in 
a different job) leads to similar overall conclusions. The heterogeneous adverse effects we 
document indicate that some groups typically ignored in the minimum wage literature are in 
fact quite vulnerable to job loss because of automation following a minimum wage increase. 
At the same time, we find that some of the adverse employment effects among low-skilled 
workers in automatable jobs are offset by increased employment opportunities for higher-
skilled workers, likely because automation of low-skilled work creates other kinds of jobs.     
Our work suggests that sharp minimum wage increases in the United States in coming 
years will shape the types of jobs held by low-skilled workers, and create employment 
challenges for some of them. Given data limitations, we cannot address the permanence of 
the effects. However, the decision to use labor-saving technology seems likely to be 
relatively permanent, especially if – as is becoming increasingly common – minimum wages 
are indexed so that a minimum wage increase results in permanently higher relative costs of 
low-skilled labor (Sorkin, 2015).  
We have followed the definitions of automatable work as provided by Autor and Dorn 
(2013). These are very useful definitions for a retrospective analysis, given that the 
occupations identified as automatable are highly credible. However, in the future many more 
occupations that employ low-skill workers are on track to be automated, even if they are not 
currently labelled as „automatable.‟ These include, for example, taxi drivers,28 cashiers,29 and 
                                                 
28
 For example, Uber is currently troubleshooting their driverless car.  
29
 There is increasing use of innovations in app technology that allow customers to help themselves to 
the products they need, pay online and never see a cashier or checkout. This technology has already 
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bricklayers.
30
 Therefore, it is important to acknowledge that increases in minimum wage will 
give incentives for firm to adopt new technologies that replace workers earlier. While these 
adoptions undoubtedly lead to increased job opportunities for some workers – for which we 
find some evidence – it is likely that there are workers who will be displaced that do not have 
the skills to do the new tasks. We have identified workers whose vulnerability to being 
replaced by machines has been amplified by minimum wage increases. Such effects may 
spread to more workers in the future. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
been adopted for low-value purchases in Apple Stores and in Amazon GO (Amazon‟s new grocery 
store).   
30
 For example, Fastbrick Robotics has now developed Hadrian X – a robot that lays 1,000 standard 
bricks in 60 minutes.  
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Figure 1: Low-skilled jobs and the level of automation over time  
 
Notes: We plot the average routine task intensity for each year, as given by equation (1). In this 
figure, the routine task intensity variable is standardized to have a mean of zero and a standard 
deviation of one.   
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for the Dependent Variables for Each Analysis 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Shares of  
automatable  
employment 
P(employed in next 
period | initially in 
automatable job) 
P(employed in next period 
in same occupation | 
initially in automatable job) 
Shares of 
automatable 
hours  
Difference in 
hours worked 
from t to t+1  
Total routine  30%   0.92   0.86 29%  0.56   
Construction  5%  0.92   0.88 4%  0.39   
Manufacturing  41%   0.88   0.88 40%  0.50   
Transport  22%   0.95   0.92 19%  0.67   
Wholesale  26%   0.92  0.88 25%  0.49  
Retail  40%   0.91  0.83 41%  0.47  
Finance  39%  0.95 0.89 36%  0.43  
Services  32%   0.92 0.88 29%  0.62  
P. Adm.  37%   0.96 0.90 35%  0.71  
Male  19%   0.91 0.87 19%  0.57  
Female  51%   0.92 0.85 48%  0.54  
≥ 40 years old 29%   0.89 0.86 29%  0.53  
26-39 years old 28%   0.95 0.89 28%  0.61  
≤ 25 years old 31%   0.88 0.79 32%  0.58  
White  29%  0.92 0.87 28%  0.56  
Black   31%   0.87 0.86 31%  0.59  
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Table 2: Full Sample Estimates, Shares of Employment in Automatable Jobs 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 Pooled Construction Manufacturing Transport Wholesale Retail Finance Services P. Adm. 
Dependent Variable = Share of Automatable Employment  
Log Min Wage          -0.031  0.003  -0.073 -0.052 0.025 -0.021 -0.002 -0.049 -0.013 
 (0.014) (0.018) (0.040) (0.025) (0.043) (0.023) (0.059) (0.035) (0.095) 
N 30963 3157 3157 3152 3147 3157 3138 3156 3060  
Notes: OLS coefficient estimates of equation (3) are reported, with standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by state. Low-skilled workers are defined as those 
who have a high school diploma equivalent or less. The share of automatable employment is based on equation (2), with data derived from Autor and Dorn (2013) and Autor et al. 
(2015). A job is classified as automatable at the three-digit occupation code level. The share of automatable employment is calculated by industry, state, and year. All regressions 
include area (state x urban) and year fixed effects. The minimum wage is measured in 2015 dollars (for which the average minimum wage is $6.77).  
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Table 3: Disaggregated Estimates, Shares of Employment in Automatable Jobs 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 Pooled Construction Manufacturing Transport Wholesale Retail Finance Services P. Adm. 
≥ 40 Years Old 
Log Min Wage  -0.051 0.010 -0.132 -0.027 0.012 -0.073 0.049 0.011 -0.239 
 (0.027) (0.020) (0.071) (0.059) (0.103) (0.048) (0.124) (0.055) (0.098) 
N 30963 3157 3157 3152 3147 3157 3138 3156 3060  
26-39 Years Old 
Log Min Wage  -0.036 0.001 -0.051 -0.076 -0.006 -0.014 -0.015 -0.064 -0.097 
  (0.019) (0.025) (0.033) (0.043) (0.066) (0.044) (0.070) (0.047) (0.096) 
N  30963  3157 3157 3152 3147 3157 3138 3156 3060  
≤ 25 Years Old 
Log Min Wage -0.074 0.018 -0.009 -0.098 -0.125 -0.014 -0.134 -0.088 -0.113 
 (0.029) (0.024) (0.074) (0.079) (0.110) (0.031) (0.102) (0.034) (0.143) 
N 30963 3157 3157 3152 3147 3157 3138 3156 3060  
Males 
Log Min Wage  0.007 -0.007 -0.046 0.006 0.042 -0.047 0.035 -0.018 0.090 
  (0.016) (0.006) (0.034) (0.022) (0.045) (0.038) (0.091) (0.028) (0.072) 
N  30963 3157 3157 3152 3147 3157 3138 3156 3060  
Females 
Log Min Wage  -0.078 0.067 -0.177 -0.090 0.011 -0.005 0.077 -0.080 -0.257 
     (0.026) (0.083) (0.078) (0.074) (0.102) (0.030) (0.049) (0.046) (0.100) 
N  30963 3157 3157 3152 3147 3157 3138 3156 3060  
White 
Log Min Wage  -0.028 -0.010 -0.065 -0.071 0.030 -0.007 0.005 -0.052 -0.110 
  (0.016) (0.020) (0.041) (0.033) (0.057) (0.033) (0.077) (0.036) (0.106) 
N  30963 3157 3157 3152 3141 3157 3138 3156 3150 
Black 
Log Min Wage  -0.067 0.026 -0.322 -0.316 0.080 0.139 -0.105 0.035 0.078 
  (0.036) (0.044) (0.129) (0.112) (0.165) (0.117) (0.180) (0.104) (0.136) 
N  22800 2273 2538 2274 1891 2730 1782 2787 2105 
Notes: See notes to Table 2.   
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Table 4: Probability of Being Employed in the Next Period, for those Initially in Automatable Job 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 Pooled Construction Manu. Transport Wholesale Retail Finance Services P. Adm. 
Full Sample 
Log Min Wage -0.0010 -0.0244 -0.0048 0.0063 -0.0009 -0.0053 -0.0055 -0.0038 0.0023 
x Routine   (0.0006) (0.0101) (0.0021) (0.0039) (0.0075) (0.0042) (0.0055) (0.0021) (0.0054) 
N 1070647 92826 255203 71470 38970 177495 50855 258671 45706 
≥ 40 Years Old 
Log Min Wage -0.0062 0.0154 -0.0251 0.0039 -0.0104 0.0002 -0.0141 -0.0014 0.0031 
x Routine   (0.0017) (0.0141) (0.0045) (0.0073) (0.0093) (0.0043) (0.0073) (0.0034) (0.0042) 
N 442627 37310 113679 34030 16449 56512 22175 113640     24171 
26-39 Years Old 
Log Min Wage -0.0004 -0.0254 -0.0007 0.0174 -0.0037 -0.0016 -0.0164 0.0010 0.0043 
x Routine   (0.0018) (0.0162) (0.0034) (0.0093) (0.0451) (0.0073) (0.0086) (0.0053) (0.0055) 
N 372237 37251 95876 27700 14805 51022 17918 86850 15753 
< 25 Years Old  
Log Min Wage -0.0154 -0.0459 -0.0224 0.0061 0.0132 -0.0143 0.0082 -0.0127 -0.0031 
x Routine   (0.0029) (0.0269) (0.0092) (0.0214) (0.0243) (0.0082) (0.0201) (0.0087) (0.0363) 
N 255783 18265 45648 9740 7716 69961 10762 58181 5782 
Males 
Log Min Wage -0.0039 -0.0574 -0.0033 0.0127 -0.0145 0.0041 -0.0040 -0.0124 -0.0013 
x Routine   (0.0021) (0.0152) (0.0034) (0.0088) (0.0111) (0.0081) (0.0102) (0.0059) (0.0072) 
N 585546 86709 164507 54742 27107 81671 14970 87839 25612 
Females 
Log Min Wage -0.0028 0.0143 -0.0198 0.0072 -0.0055 -0.0141 -0.0200 -0.0025 -0.0134 
x Routine   (0.0020) (0.0262) (0.0056) (0.0119) (0.0124) (0.0059) (0.010) (0.0035) (0.0114) 
N 485101 6117 90696 16728 11863 95824 35885 170832 20094 
White  
Log Min Wage -0.0016 -0.0184 -0.0045 0.0132 0.0017 -0.0010 -0.0003 -0.0013 0.0024 
x Routine   (0.0012) (0.0108) (0.0023) (0.0105) (0.0067) (0.0047) (0.0057) (0.0032) (0.0052) 
N 919099 84306 223215 62070 35172 156556 45125 209997 36738 
Black   
Log Min Wage -0.0038 -0.0445 -0.0074 -0.0324 -0.0767 -0.0263 -0.0328 -0.0077 0.0012 
x Routine   (0.0051) (0.0693) (0.0081) (0.0201) (0.0424) (0.0202) (0.0363) (0.0054) (0.0163) 
N 120221 6460 25866 7870 2870 14621 4497 40118 7263 
Notes: See notes to Table 2.  OLS coefficient estimates of equation (3) are reported, with standard errors in parentheses.  
Standard errors are clustered by state. Dependent variable is equal to 1 if a person is employed in t+1, 0 if they nonemployed. 
Sample is those employed in period t. All regressions include state x urban x year fixed effects, and an urban dummy variable. 
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Table 5: Probability of Being Employed, in the Same Job, in the Next Period, for those Initially in 
Automatable Job 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 Pooled Construction Manu. Transport Wholesale Retail Finance Services P. Adm. 
Full Sample 
Log Min Wage  -0.0213 -0.0197 -0.0168 -0.0323 -0.0282 0.0514 -0.0432 -0.0407 -0.0348 
x Routine   (0.0015) (0.0157) (0.0051) (0.0092) (0.0129) (0.0054) (0.0078) (0.0046) (0.0071) 
N 1070647 92826 255203 71470 38970 177495 50855 258671 45706 
≥ 40 Years Old 
Log Min Wage -0.0265 0.0204 -0.0194 -0.0179 0.0017 0.0284 -0.0319 -0.0301 -0.0196 
x Routine   (0.0022) (0.0223) (0.0055) (0.0113) (0.0197) (0.0087) (0.0121) (0.0058) (0.0124) 
N 442627 37310 113679 34030 16449 56512 22175 113640   24171 
26-39 Years Old 
Log Min Wage -0.0039 -0.0253 -0.0091 0.0174 0.016 -0.0025 -0.0165 0.0013 0.0093 
x Routine   (0.0027) (0.0163) (0.0037) (0.0098) (0.0154 (0.0088) (0.0091) (0.0054) (0.0082) 
N 372237 37251 95876 27700 14805 51022 17918 86850 15753 
< 25 Years Old  
Log Min Wage -0.0468 -0.1000 -0.0019 -0.1088 -0.1352 0.0695 -0.0512 -0.0503 -0.0737 
x Routine   (0.0039) (0.0474) (0.0121) (0.0372) (0.0450) (0.0095) (0.0458) (0.0098) (0.0375) 
N 255783 18265 45648 9740 7716 69961 10762 58181 5782 
Males 
Log Min Wage -0.0172 -0.0126 -0.0110 -0.0174 0.0068 0.0291 -0.0950 -0.0593 -0.0573 
x Routine   (0.0023) (0.0234) (0.0040) (0.0159) (0.0247) (0.0086) (0.0136) (0.0111) (0.0127) 
N 585546 86709 164507 54742 27107 81671 14970 87839 25612 
Females  
Log Min Wage -0.0079 -0.1672 0.0069 -0.0767 -0.1012 0.0709 -0.0943 -0.0257 -0.1096 
x Routine   (0.0022) (0.0326) (0.0103) (0.0181) (0.0416) (0.0089) (0.0193) (0.0047) (0.0127) 
N 485101 6117 90696 16728 11863 95824 35885 170832 20094 
White  
Log Min Wage -0.0152 -0.0191 -0.0101 -0.0308 -0.0276 0.0559 -0.0779 -0.0456 -0.0229 
x Routine   (0.0017) (0.0160) (0.0033) (0.0105) (0.0096) (0.0063) (0.0084) (0.0060) (0.0079) 
N 919099 84306 223215 62070 35172 156556 45125 209997 36738 
Black   
Log Min Wage -0.0142 0.0995 0.0274 -0.0319 0.0021 -0.0093 0.0225 -0.0198 -0.0865 
x Routine   (0.0050) (0.0853) (0.0192) (0.0228) (0.0544) (0.0224) (0.0304) (0.0110) (0.0335) 
N 120221 6460 25866 7870 2870 14621 4497 40118 7263 
Notes: See notes to Tables 2 and 4. . Dependent variable is equal to 1 if a person is employed in the same 3-digit occupation and 
1-digit industry in t+1, and 0 if they are nonemployed or not in the same “job.”  
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Table 6: Probability of Being Employed in a Specific Industry in t+1 if Employed in 
an Automatable Job in Period t 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Retail Services Retail or Services 
Dependent Variable = Employed in Retail/Services in t+1  
Include nonemployed in t+1 
Log Min Wage  0.0190  0.0101 0.0106 
 (0.0009) (0.0012) (0.0010)  
N 893152 811976 634481 
Exclude nonemployed in t+1 
Log Min Wage  0.0147 0.0135 0.0129 
 (0.0008) (0.0012) (0.0013)  
N 818733 797465 545551 
Notes: See notes to Table 4. Sample is the subsample of Table 4 that is employed in period t, but not 
in retail or services (or both, depending on the column). In bottom panel, those nonemployed in t+1 
are excluded. Dependent variable is equal to 1 if a person moves to the indicated industry in t+1, and 
0 if they are continued to work in a different industry (or, in top panel, are nonemployed). For 
example, in the bottom panel of column (1), the sample is those employed, but not in retail, in period 
t; the dependent variable is equal to 1 if the person is employed in retail in t+1, and zero otherwise.  
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Table 7: Hours Analysis 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dependent Variable = Share of Hours in Automatable Jobs   
 
Pooled 
≥ 40  
Years Old 
26-39 
Years Old 
< 25 Years 
Old Male Female White Black 
Log Min 
Wage    
-0.015 -0.077  -0.006 -0.014  -0.023  -0.094  -0.013  -0.074  
 (0.017) (0.035)  (0.021)  (0.039)  (0.0016)  (0.0028)  (0.019)  (0.035)  
N 30963  30963  30963 30963    30963 30963 30963 22800 
 Construct Manu. Transport Wholesale Retail Finance Services P. Adm. 
Log Min 
Wage  -0.010 -0.084 -0.052 0.077 0.003 0.060 -0.018 -0.125 
 (0.012) (0.041) (0.040) (0.060) (0.027) (0.072) (0.024) (0.068) 
N 3017 3017 3011 3000 3017 2990 3016 3006 
Dependent Variable = Hours Difference from Period 1 to Period 2     
 Pooled ≥ 40 Years 
Old 
26-39 
Years Old 
< 25 Years 
Old 
Male Female White Black 
Log Min 
Wage 
-1.646 -2.508 
-3.607 0.555 -2.669 -0.975 -2.562 -0.896 
x Routine   (0.175) (0.272) (0.447) (0.561) (0.380) (0.266) (0.293) (0.603) 
N 696432 330014 225466 140952 384574 311858 568524 82581 
 Construct Manu. Transport Wholesale Retail Finance Services P. Adm. 
Log Min 
Wage -10.356 -3.035 -5.790 -3.096 0.022 -2.748 -1.401 -1.942 
x Routine   (1.674) (1.516) (1.338) (1.478) (0.567) (0.934) (0.460) (1.101) 
N 77628 122638 46009 23443 138791 29655 208287 39762 
Notes: See notes to Table 2. In the top panel, the share of automatable hours worked is calculated in the same manner 
as the share of automatable employment in Table 2. In the bottom panel, the sample only includes individuals who 
remained employed between the two periods, so the sample sizes are lower than for the employment regressions.  
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Table 8: Contemporary Analysis, 1995-2016 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dependent Variable = Share of Employment in Automatable Jobs   
 
Pooled 
≥ 40  
Years Old 
26-39 
Years Old 
< 25 
Years Old Male Female White Black 
Log Min Wage  -0.038  -0.069  -0.025  -0.050 -0.021  -0.058  -0.029  -0.030 
    (0.022)  (0.034)  (0.027)  (0.037)  (0.020)  (0.034)  (0.022)  (0.059)  
N 19154  11886 11860 11510 12020 11553 12025 8264 
 Construct Manu. Transport Wholesale Retail Finance Services P. Adm. 
Log Min Wage  0.001 -0.066 -0.079 0.093 -0.024 -0.021 -0.036 -0.147 
 (0.017) (0.062) (0.048) (0.057) (0.030) (0.068) (0.031) (0.090) 
N 1964 1964 1959 1954 1964 1945 1963 1957 
Dependent Variable = Probability of Being Employed in the Current Period    
 
Pooled 
≥ 40 Years 
Old 
26-39 
Years Old 
< 25 
Years Old Male Female White Black 
Log Min Wage -0.020 -0.037 -0.027 -0.008 -0.017 -0.025 -0.028 0.027 
x Routine   (0.009) (0.015) (0.011) (0.030) (0.012) (0.0013) (0.0009) (0.040) 
N 642054 215655 299300 127095 352971 289083 537369 71820 
 Construct Manu. Transport Wholesale Retail Finance Services P. Adm. 
Log Min Wage -0.091 -0.067 0.027 -0.067 0.047 -0.037 -0.002 -0.012 
x Routine   (0.069) (0.029) (0.057) (0.048) (0.028) (0.032) (0.012) (0.037) 
N 69579 114738 40614 23340 110355 32364 175239 23043 
Dependent Variable = Probability of Having the Same Job in the Current Period    
 
Pooled 
≥ 40 Years 
Old 
26-39 
Years Old 
< 25 
Years Old Male Female White Black 
Log Min Wage -0.042 -0.059 -0.034 -0.058 -0.018 -0.044 -0.044 -0.020 
x Routine   (0.011) (0.020) (0.013) (0.039) (0.013) (0.016) (0.012) (0.037) 
N 642054 215655 299300 127095 352971 289083 537369 71820 
 Construct Manu. Transport Wholesale Retail Finance Services P. Adm. 
Log Min Wage -0.128 -0.050 0.005 0.023 0.053 -0.008 -0.176 -0.056 
x Routine   (0.122) (0.028) (0.053) (0.077) (0.036) (0.043) (0.038) (0.047) 
N 69579 114738 40614  23340 110355 32364 175239 23043 
Notes: See notes to Table 2 and 4. 
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Table 9: Examples of Top and Bottom Tertile Wage Occupations in Manufacturing 
 Top Tertile Bottom Tertile 
1 Repairers of data processing equipment  Sawing machine operators  
2 Water and sewage treatment plant operators  Assemblers of electrical equipment  
3 Millwrights  Food roasting and baking machine operators  
4 Supervisors of mechanics and repairers  Cooks  
5 Elevator installers and repairers  Packers  
6 Repairers of electrical equipment  Parking lot attendants 
7 Plant and system operators, stationary engineers  Metal platers  
8 Railroad conductors and yardmasters  Textile sewing machine operators  
9 Electricians  Clothing pressing machine operators 
10 Tool and die-makers and die-setters  Molders and casting machine operators  
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Table 10: Manufacturing Low-Wage versus High-Wage Occupations 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Pooled ≥ 40 Years Old 26-39 Years Old < 25 Years Old Male Female White Black 
Dependent Variable = Share of Employment in Automatable Jobs 
Low-Wage 
Log Min Wage  -0.161  -0.189  -0.117  -0.131  -0.123 -0.156 -0.182   -0.443 
 (0.058)  (0.087)  (0.077)  (0.146)  (0.054)  (0.093)  (0.055)  (0.145)  
N 3157  3157 3157 3157 3157 3157  3157  2273  
High-Wage 
Log Min Wage  -0.035          -0.080  0.015  -0.086  -0.004  -0.065  0.027  0.168 
 (0.056)  (0.079)  (0.072)  (0.075)  (0.061)  (0.084)  (0.065)  (0.160)  
N 3157  3157 3157 3157 3157 3157  3157  2273  
Dependent Variable = Probability of Being Employed in the Current Period  
Low-Wage 
Log Min Wage -0.014 -0.043 -0.0002 -0.035 -0.016 -0.015 -0.018 -0.009 
x Routine   (0.003) (0.005) (0.006) (0.010) (0.005) (0.006) (0.003) (0.009) 
N 137719 47797 75558 27759 68542 69177 116763 16930 
High-Wage 
Log Min Wage 0.003 -0.008 0.002 -0.024 0.007 0.014 0.004 0.010 
x Routine   (0.012) (0.024) (0.025) (0.075) (0.012) (0.021) (0.011) (0.041) 
N 24243 12974 9624            1645  19617 4626 23140 767 
Dependent Variable = Probability of Being Employed in the Same Job in the Current Period 
Low-Wage  
Log Min Wage -0.025 -0.017 -0.028 -0.015 -0.018 -0.024 -0.013 -0.240 
x Routine   (0.012) (0.016) (0.042) (0.079) (0.021) (0.022) (0.011) (0.454) 
N 137714 75554 47795 27759 68537 69177 116758 16930 
High-Wage  
Log Min Wage 0.005 -0.001 0.005 -0.012 0.002 0.015 0.003 0.036 
x Routine   (0.004) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.015) 
N 24230 14611  7975  1644  19606 4624 23129 766 
Notes: See notes to Tables 2, 3, and 4.  
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Table 11: Higher-Skill Workers Related to the Interaction Between Minimum Wage and the Share of Low-Skill Routine Work 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dependent Variable = Probability of Being Employed in the Current Period    
 Pooled ≥ 40 Years Old 26-39 Years Old < 25 Years Old Male Female White Black 
Min Wage   0.0562         0.0539          0.0980  0.1992  0.0496  0.0648 0.0351 0.0133  
  x Share of Low-Skill Routine Work   (0.0474)  (0.0551)  (0.0443)  (0.0958)  (0.0420)  (0.0558)  (0.0390)  (0.0934)  
N 1178234 602114 576120 152538 600762  576120 981685 196549 
 Construct Manu. Transport Wholesale Retail Finance Services P. Adm. 
Min Wage  0.8058 0.0141  0.0923 0.0351 -0.0968  -0.0365  0.0782 -0.0293  
  x Share of Low-Skill Routine Work   (0.6797)  (0.0946)  (0.1559) (0.1039) (0.1032)  (0.0420)  (0.0641)  (0.0362) 
N 50495 135336          58552          37394 134000 95834 533856 77500 
Dependent Variable = Probability of Having the Same Job in the Current Period    
 Pooled ≥ 40 Years Old 26-39 Years Old < 25 Years Old Male Female White Black 
Min Wage  0.0151 -0.00083 0.0241        0.0225 0.0243  0.0603 0.0130 0.0293  
  x Share of Low-Skill Routine Work   (0.0173)  (0.0115)  (0.0248)  (0.0369)  (0.0213)  (0.0170)  (0.0178)  (0.0398)  
N 1178234 602114 576120 152538 600762  576120 981685 196549 
 Construct Manu. Transport Wholesale Retail Finance Services P. Adm. 
Min Wage  0.3163 0.0196 0.3296  -0.0048 0.0147     -0.0193 0.1308 0.1338  
  x Share of Low-Skill Routine Work   (0.5400)  (0.1187)  (0.1829)  (0.1417)  (0.2332)  (0.0415)  (0.0845)  (0.0462)  
N 50495 135336    58552     37394 134000 95834 533856 77500 
Notes: The Share of Low-Skill Routine Work is defined as the share in the individual‟s area, year, and industry. This share is calculated following equation (5) and 
matched into the dataset used for the analysis in Table 4 based on industry, area, and year.  In this case the data retains higher-skill individuals only in the sample. 
Higher-skilled individuals are those with more than a high school degree.  See also notes to Table 2.  
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Appendix A: Manufacturing Low-Wage Industries versus High-Wage Industries 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Pooled ≥ 40 Years Old 26-39 Years Old < 25 Years Old Male Female White Black 
Dependent Variable =  Share of Employment in Automatable Jobs 
Low-Wage 
Min Wage  -0.109 -0.147 -0.091 -0.068 -0.094  -0.149 -0.128 -0.213  
    (0.051)  (0.077)  (0.054)  (0.010) (0.054)  (0.073)  (0.055) (0.133)  
N 3157  3157 3157 3157 3157 3157  3157  2273  
High-Wage 
Min Wage  0.012  0.009  0.055   0.157 -0.006  -0.061  0.005 -0.101 
    (0.042)  (0.068)  (0.062)  (0.084)  (0.050)  (0.064)  (0.053)  (0.124)  
N 3157  3157 3157 3157 3157 3157  3157  2273  
Dependent Variable = Probability of Being Employed in the Current Period  
Low-Wage 
Log Min Wage -0.010 -0.029 -0.006 -0.035 -0.004 -0.021 -0.008 -0.010 
x Routine   (0.004) (0.006) (0.007) (0.012) (0.006) (0.008) (0.004) (0.012) 
N 90175 48311 31037 17272  48065 42110 77096 10258 
High-Wage 
Log Min Wage 0.005 -0.005 0.000 -0.011 0.005 -0.025 0.007 0.014 
x Routine   (0.004) (0.009) (0.010) (0.017) (0.005) (0.011) (0.004) (0.021) 
N 66188 32402 23434 8968 50941 15247 57967 7216 
Dependent Variable = Probability of Being Employed in the Same Job Current Period 
Low-Wage  
Log Min Wage -0.019 -0.018 -0.013 -0.043 -0.0011 -0.025 -0.011 -0.033 
x Routine   (0.005) (0.008) (0.012) (0.015) (0.007) (0.014) (0.005) (0.021) 
N 90167 48308 31035 17272  48058 42109 77088 10258 
High-Wage  
Log Min Wage 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.002 -0.003 0.009 0.003 0.006 
x Routine   (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.006) 
N 66179 32401 23433 8968  50925 115244 57961 7214 
Notes: See notes to Tables 2, 3, and 4. For each low-skill sub-industry (at the two-digit level) within manufacturing, we compute average wages from 
the 1980-2016 Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups of the CPS. The low-wage sub-sample is the bottom tertile of industries in this distribution, and the 
high-wage subsample is the top tertile.  
